The Defence Secretary said “the real battle for defence” will come in the Comprehensive Spending Review in 2024-25, and “I’m not sure I’ll be here in two years”.
The conventional war on the Central European landmass unfolding before us is a massive international event – comparable in security terms to a 9/11.
The ONS published data in March showing that they face the highest risk of death from Covid-19, more than any other occupation.
Our introduction to: what each Bill is, the politics of it, who’s responsible, arguments for and against – and a controversy rating out of ten.
It can become the best again, but only if the land forces element is revisited in the Government’s proposal.
In place of deviations from the Number Ten line have come the squashing of Rayner and even a comparison of the PM to Churchill.
That sorrow, more profound than many people had expected, is a measure of the affection and respect in which he was held.
Even if a large conventional military suited Britain’s needs, the public is not prepared to pay for one.
Wallace has done well to win an exceptional defence settlement, but it may not be enough to fund all the Integrated Review’s ambitions.
The impulse of Brexit is to prove Britain’s openness by striking out, but this tilt increases our security dependence on Europe.
And if that projection is to be effective, we will need to invest in our operating bases – and not just at traditional sites.
Despite a surprisingly liberal migration policy, the bulk of the post-Brexit evidence so far suggests not.
The delay to the review, historic increases to defence spending and rumoured cuts to troop numbers paint a picture of an organisation in flux.
The APPG’s survey of ex-servicemen and women will reveal where current support systems are falling short of the first-class standards we expect.